The PKO-Debate in Japan and Germany in Comparison

paper to be presented at Hokusei Gakuen University, Sapporo,
1 Oct 1996, 13:00

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(1) discussing about PKO

Both Germany and Japan contributed to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations for a long time before the end of the Cold War, either by providing material supplies or transportation or by paying their special PKO contributions to the U.N. But during the Cold War U.N. peacekeeping mission were clearly restricted to administer cease-fire agreements or monitor elections, and the U.N. acted as a neutral observer. It is important to remember that during the Cold War U.N. PKO usually did not involve the use of military power in order to enforce any kind of political aim. This kind of "traditional" PKO plus U.N. diplomacy played a very positive role in the late 1980s to help end regional wars which had been influenced by the East West conflict, such as the wars in Afghanistan, in Central America, in Southern Africa, in Cambodia or between Iraq and Iran. This is why U.N. PKO earned a high reputation among the world public and why the U.N. PKO soldiers were awarded the Nobel Prize in 1988.

Well, how could U.N. PKO become such a controversial issue in the German and Japanese political debate? I would like to present the argument here that the controversy about PKO in Germany and Japan started with the second Gulf War. During the Cold War both Japan and Germany kept a low profile in military affairs. Both reluctantly rearmed after World War II, being firmly linked to the U.S. alliance system. Japan's Self Defense forces should only defend Japanese territory, the German Bundeswehr should only contribute to the collective defense of NATO against eventual attacks by the communist countries of Eastern Europe, the so-called Warsaw Treaty countries. Nobody seriously wanted to send Japanese or German troops to overseas missions.

With the end of the Cold War the role of the U.N. and of the Western military alliance system changed. Many people hoped that the end of the Cold War might give peace a chance, by scrapping nuclear arms and conventional arms, by successfully establishing regional peace and security
arrangements in all conflict regions of the world and by strengthening the authority of the United Nations as supreme world government.

But this turned out to be an illusion. I would like to show, how military strategists, uninhibited by the constraints of the Cold War, tried to use the high prestige of the United Nations PKO in order to rejustify the new military interventionism of the club of rich countries. I think it is particularly interesting to analyze the PKO debate in Germany and Japan, both countries which kept a low military profile during the Cold War. There are questions such as the following:

- Is the militarization even of Germany and Japan inevitable?
- Will both countries become major military powers, based on their huge economic ressources?
- Will public opinion be strong enough to restrain military strategists in both countries from participating in Western military interventionism?

In what follows I will first discuss the meaning of peacekeeping and introduce the theoretical concept of the trading state. Next, I will analyze the PKO debate in Japan and the PKO debate in Germany. And finally I will draw comparative conclusions in order to find an answer to the questions just mentioned.

**(2) the end of the cold war and the new world order**

In the PKO debate there is a lot of confusion about the concept of peacekeeping, and I even suspect that military strategists are deliberately trying to confuse the public using terms like "robust" peacekeeping or "new" peacekeeping. The concept of traditional U.N. PKO during the Cold War was not covered by the U.N. charter. U.N. PKO had been developed as a new strategy by then U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld in 1956 who wanted to stabilize the cease-fire which ended the Suez war of Israel, Britain and France against Egypt. Hammarskjöld's idea was to use military forces for peacekeeping without actually using military force, in other word to implement peaceful conflict resolution based on the consent of all conflicting parties by sending troops not as fighters, but as observers, monitors, engineers or administrators. This strategy made U.N. PKOs attractive to both the public as well as to the military strategists of the superpowers. After the end of the Cold War, however, the mass media bombarded the public with reports about human suffering in cruel civil wars, and many people came to think that having sent troops to conflict regions the U.N. might as well use military power in order to stop fighting and enforce human rights and peace. This constituted a decisive change of the concept of U.N. peacekeeping, because the "new" type of peacekeeping is not based any more on the consent of all conflicting parties but on an imagined general global consensus about human rights which are to enforced by military power, if necessary against the will of local conflict actors.

So, is military violence acceptable under U.N. command? Like many social scientists and peace researchers I am convinced that the U.N. is not capable to act as a world policeman, more generally
speaking: that world problems cannot be solved by military interventions and that military interventions would still primarily be used for national or special interest groups' interests. Therefore it is very important to clearly distinguish the traditional concept of U.N. PKO from military interventions such as the Gulf War in 1991. The very base of traditional peacekeeping is the consent of the conflicting parties or at least the general consensus not to solve the conflict by military force, to use military force only for self-defense.

In June 1992 U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published a report to the Security Council called "Agenda for Peace". He basically tried to present a consistent strategy for the U.N. taking into account recent experiences with peacekeeping and with the Gulf War and public expectations in an effective U.N.. This report has found a wide but divided reception in the public. My own interpretation of the "Agenda for Peace" is rather sceptical:

- Most importantly the Secretary General proposed that the U.N. should be willing to engage in "peace-building" by force, including military force, economic sanctions, international courts of justice etc. He also wanted the U.N. to have standing rapid deployment forces under U.N. command in order to deter potential aggressors, but since this would not be acceptable to the big powers he also accepted to delegate the implementation of peace-building measures to U.N. member states or to collective security organizations. Basically this justified the U.S. organized Gulf war, and later on also helped to legitimize NATO air strikes in Bosnia. One problem with this first proposal is of course the willingness to solve political disputes by force. The other problem is that for all practical purposes, the permanent members of the Security Council of the U.N. would become the generals of the world police, generals, which are neither elected ny anybody nor responsible to anybody else than themselves.

- Second, he proposed to extend U.N. activities to prevent wars by organizing early warning systems, by introducing confidence and security building measures, by establishing preventive buffer zones and by sending fact finding missions. Unfortunately, in this proposal he mixed non-military mediation strategies with the concept of deterrence and balances of power.

- Third he defended the usefulness of traditional peacekeeping and demanded a better training for military as well as civilian peacekeeping personnel.

- Forth, he proposed peace consolidation measures to rebuild war torn societies, such as repatriation of refugees, organizing elections, rebuilding the infrastructure and public administration and the like. This was basically the extension of development aid to countries destroyed after a war.

Proposals 3 and 4 are very reasonable, of course. But I fear, that they merely distract the public's attention from proposals 1 and 2.

In a more general perspective, this "Agenda for Peace" very well reflects the confusion in the peacekeeping debate. Most basically, it creates the wrong impression that military conflicts can actually be solved by military means. It unfortunately helps to mix the very useful instruments of peaceful conflict resolution with military enforcement measures, thus inevitably destroying the credibility of peaceful conflict resolution.
The reasons for rejecting military force as a political instrument in the contemporary world have been elaborated theoretically, among others, by the U.S. social scientist Richard Rosecrance in his bestselling book "The Rise of the Trading States". This book is also particularly interesting for our discussion here, because Rosecrance explicitly tries to explain the low military profile of Japan and Germany. According to Rosecrance, trading states are states in which there exists a broad political consensus about the uselessness of modern warfare. Basically this consensus is based on three principal arguments:

first, economically, nations do not gain profits from wars, but rather wars will ruin nations;
second, politically, military strategies do not lead to security and do not support democracy but rather stabilize permanent distrust and authoritarian rule;
third, technologically, there can be no effective shelter or defense against the destructiveness of modern warfare, including among others weapons of mass destruction, air bombings or missile attacks.

Rosecrance also said that thinking in terms of the trading state logic will only spread by the process of social learning. Social learning happened for example when nations like Japan and Germany during World War II traumatically experienced the usefulness and destructiveness of modern warfare. These nations became trading states by either abolishing the military or at least by restricting their armed forces to purely defensive functions. On the other hand, a consensus developed that global economic, social and environmental problems and interdependencies would ultimately force every state to cooperate with other states peacefully and in a civilized way. Rosecrance argued that the choice between the trading and the military world, affected by cost/benefit calculations plus social learning, had existed for a long time. However, favorable conditions for successfully learning and accepting the trading state logic did only emerge after 1945. Rosecrance also mentioned that the "normal" state of the future would be the trading state and not the military state. In the introduction to his book he wrote that

"... it is not the American model that Japan will ultimately follow. Rather, it is the Japanese model that America may ultimately follow".

Conservative strategists argued, however, that Japan and Germany kept in the background militarily during the Cold War not because they had accepted the trading state logic but rather because of the controls imposed upon them by the United States and other Western powers and because of the dominance of the East West conflict. When the Cold War ended they predicted Japan and Germany to become "normal" states and military great powers again. Liberal peace researchers hoped that Japan and Germany could become models for other states to follow and to eventually become trading states as well. They hoped that the end of the Cold War might lead to worldwide disarmament, to peaceful conflict resolution by the United Nations and to the spread of the trading state logic. Having said that, it becomes obvious that peacekeeping politics in both Japan and Germany are very interesting in theoretical terms as well as in practical political terms.
But now let's have a look on how the PKO debate actually developed in Japan and Germany. I will first take the case of Japan and then Germany.

(3) the PKO debate in Japan

Japan's defeat in 1945 meant the defeat of Japan's historical militarism which had for a long time determined Japan's foreign policy. One might argue that the experience of World War II ultimately resulted in social learning very much like Rosecrance described. More precisely, the futility and uselessness of military foreign policy has been institutionalized in the provisions of the Japanese Constitution in which Japan renounces war as a means of settling political disputes and bans armed forces. It is true that Article 9 has been very much influenced by General MacArthur and the U.S. military government in Japan. But during the Korean war the U.S. government lost its interest in Article 9 and ordered the Japanese government to rearm under the terms of the "Ampô", the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Therefore, to my opinion, it was ultimately not the U.S., but rather the strong pacifist sentiment in the Japanese public opinion and the activities of Japanese peace movements which helped to establish the Peace Constitution.

Because of the Peace Constitution Japan's military has been put under strong restrictions, such as the ban of nuclear arms, the ban of arms exports, the ban of military conscription, the ban of offensive armament, the limitation of the military budget to 1 % of the GNP and most important to our discussion here the ban of overseas military engagement of the Jieitai. During the Cold War there was a slow but steady arms build up in Japan, and since the late 1970s military cooperation with the U.S. became much closer. From time to time the military restrictions were tightened or relaxed a little bit, but in general they remained unchanged.

The negative side of this policy was that Japan's conservative governments pursued a very passive and isolationist foreign policy and did not contribute very much to world order. In the late 1970s the U.S. and other states demanded "burden sharing" from Japan. The Japanese government accepted a more active role in foreign policy, but Japan's contributions basically were non-military contributions, such as ODA, assistance for refugees, peaceful diplomacy. In 1989 the Japanese government sent 27 civilian observers and experts to support UNTAG, the U.N. PKO to prepare the independence of Namibia. In 1990 6 Japanese civilians were sent to the U.N. PKO in Nicaragua to monitor the elections. This all happened in the context of the traditional concept of peacekeeping, and there was virtually no controversy in Japan about that.

The Gulf war posed a serious challenge to Japan's peaceful, but low profile foreign policy. The Gulf war was not a traditional U.N. PKO, but the U.N. Security Council had basically given the U.S a free hand in dealing with Iraq. The U.S. demanded that Japan should send military personnel to support the allied operation against Iraq. The Allies did not really need Japanese soldiers; they won the war anyway without Jieitai. Some commentators said that the military strategists of the so-called
new world order quite simply wanted Japan to support visibly the legitimacy of military interventions by risking Japanese blood as well. Prime Minster Kaifu Toshiki launched a bill to make possible participation of the Jieitai in U.N. PKO, but the bill was stopped by factional struggles within the LDP. Then the government offered to send military transport aircraft to the Gulf which were not needed there. Finally in April 1991, after the end of the Gulf War, Japanese minesweepers were sent to the Gulf in order to clear mines. These attempts for a symbolical participation of the Jieitai all remained unconvincing. The really substantial contribution of Japan was the payment of US$ 9 billion for the allied military.

In the context of these experiences an extensive debate in Japan started about the future role of the Jieitai. Conservative politicians such as Ozawa Ichirō wanted Japan to become a "normal state" by revising or re-interpreting the Peace Constitution and allowing full Jieitai participation in military interventions under the mandate by the U.N. Security Council. They also wanted Japan to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. But the opposition of the public as well as the smaller political parties was strong. After bitter controversy and much political bargaining the Diet passed the PKO law in August 1992.

The PKO law allows the Japanese government to send as many as 2,000 military and civilian personnel to U.N. PKO, but Japanese members of PKO may not participate in military activities. There are five preconditions for participation of Japanese personnel in PKO:
(1) there has to be a cease fire agreement in effect
(2) there has to be the consent of all conflicting parties to the U.N. PKO and participation of Japan
(3) the PKO has to be strictly neutral
(4) if these preconditions are not fully met any more Japanese members have to be pulled back
(5) weapons may only be used for self defense.

In September 1992 Japan sent some 600 military engineers to UNTAC, the U.N. PKO in Cambodia, to rebuild streets, plus 75 police officers to support UNTAC civilian police plus 41 civilians for the electoral component of UNTAC. The Japanese government made efforts to limit SDF activities to a mission where the use of arms seemed unlikely. The Jieitai were not placed under the operational command of the UNTAC, so that only the Japanese government had the right to decide on the use of weapons. The media reported about the excessive concern of the Japanese about their own safety and the government downplayed the dangers inherent in the operation. This strategy backlashed when actual casualties happened: in April 1993 one Japanese election monitor was killed and in May 1993 a group of Japanese civilian policemen were attacked and one of them was killed. The accord between the conflicting parties, legally required for Japanese participation by the PKO law, eroded when the Khmer Rouge started to boycott the election process. But finally UNTAC could be ended successfully in September 1993.
The Cambodia mission was an important lesson to the Japanese public. It helped to educate the public about the dangers as well as the opportunities and usefulness of traditional U.N. PKO and the importance of peaceful and civilian components of peacekeeping. It also helped to raise the question whether Jieitai were really needed for peacekeeping. This very much resembles the image of the Jieitai in Japan. According to opinion polls conducted in Japan, people think that the most important task of the Jieitai is to help in disaster relief and public work. So Japanese participation in traditional U.N. PKO could as well be regarded as disaster relief.

Since then Japan continues to participate in this kind of traditional, disaster relief-type of U.N. PKO. In fall 1992 three Japanese election monitors were sent to Angola. From May 1993 to November 1994 a total of 69 Japanese traffic control staff and election monitors were sent to Mozambique. In March and April 1994 a total of 30 election observers were sent to El Salvador. In addition to cooperation in U.N. peace-keeping activities, Japan dispatched Jieitai personnel to Goma, Zaire, in 1994, to conduct humanitarian relief operations for Rwandan refugees. It was the first time that Japan engaged in such large-scale international humanitarian relief operations. Recently, Jieitai participated in the U.N. seize fire observation in the Golan Heights. On the other hand Japanese government consistently rejected U.N. requests to send Japanese soldiers to participate in the new intervention-type U.N. PKO in Somalia, Haiti or former Yugoslavia. However, Japan contributed financially to these missions.

Some people feared that participation of the Jieitai in U.N. PKO would end military restrictions in Japan. There is in fact the attempt by conservative politicians to slowly but gradually erode the Peace Constitution. But as far as PKO is concerned, both the provisions of the Japanese PKO law as well as the practical experiences with Japan's PKO policy do not support this fear. Rather, by consistently rejecting participation in the new interventionist type of PKO Japan helped to strengthen traditional U.N. PKO. This becomes much clearer when we compare Japanese with German PKO policy.

(4) the PKO debate in Germany

At first glance, the German situation seems to be quite similar to the Japanese. Both countries experienced military imperialism in World War II. Both countries were completely defeated in 1945. In both countries the new constitution provided for a peaceful foreign policy. Germany was divided as a result of the East-West conflict and two German states were founded in 1949, with West Berlin located as an island inside East Germany. Because of the East-West conflict the West German constitution stressed the Western values of human rights and democracy which ought to be defended against communism. Later in 1990 Germany reunited under the West German Constitution.
Back in the Cold War, in 1955, West Germany regained its sovereignty in the context of European integration and NATO, which was linked to a military contribution of Germany. Therefore the constitution had to be revised and provisions for the establishment of armed forces as well as military conscription were included. The constitutional framework of the 1950s for West German military policy still is valid today. The common interpretation of the constitution says that it includes both provisions against illegitimate use of the military as well as provisions legitimizing the use of the military for the defense of democracy. Article 26 of the constitution outlaws wars of aggression and Article 4 guarantees the right of conscientious objection (heikei kyôhi), so that no German can be forced to become a soldier against his ethical convictions or religious belief. On the other hand Art. 24 provides for participation in a system of collective security. Art. 87a says that armed forces may be established for defensive purposes including collective defense. Art. 115a says that a declaration of an armed attack on Germany and a state of emergency may only be issued by a vote of two thirds of the members of the Bundestag, the German House of Representatives. For a long time there was a consensus among the political parties that the constitution restricted the use of force by the German military to the defense of Germany and its NATO allies within the NATO area. These restrictions, however, did not include other activities of the Bundeswehr not involving military force, such as training foreign military forces or providing humanitarian assistance. So actually the West German Constitution is much less restrictive than the Japanese Constitution.

German peace movements in the 1950s opposed military conscription as well as planned nuclear armament of the German military. There was a wide spread fear that Germany would become the main battlefield if the Cold War became a hot war in Europe. During the Cold War Germany, East and West, was extremely militarized, including extensive foreign military bases and nuclear weapons deployment. In the 1970s social democratic West German governments were very much engaged in détente, trying to reduce the imminent danger of an East-West war. The government put great expectations in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which was supposed to form a bridge between NATO countries and Warshaw treaty countries. Meanwhile, competition between East and West intensified again, especially in different parts of the Third World such as the Gulf region, Southern Africa, Afghanistan, Central America and Southeast Asia. The US government and NATO prepared to establish rapid deployment forces for military interventions worldwide. In Europe, CSCE and détente lost its importance and nuclear deterrence was strengthened with the planned introduction of new missiles to be deployed mainly in Germany. In the early 1980s a mass peace movement in Germany opposed this new strategy, strongly criticizing NATO and its nuclear arms build up. One of the popular slogans for example said that Germany should not become Euroshima.

But to everybody's surprise the Cold War disappeared in the late 1980s: Regional conflicts in the Third World, dominated by the East West conflict, could be ended with the help of the United Nations. The superpowers agreed to scrap most of their nuclear arms. NATO and Warshaw treaty countries revived CSCE and concluded an agreement about massive arms reductions in Europe.
Germany was to be reunited under the condition that it would reduce its armed forces with a combined size of almost 700,000 soldiers to a maximum of 370,000 soldiers, that it would renounce nuclear armament and that most of the foreign military bases in Germany would be closed. The peace movement quickly dissolved.

As part of the ending of the Cold War both West and East Germany contributed civilian personnel including civilian police to the U.N. PKOs in Namibia as well as in Central America starting in 1989. After unification Germany actively supported CSCE observer missions in different conflict regions in the former Eastern bloc.

On the other hand the process of European integration intensified. The political leaders of several EU member countries wanted to include military and foreign policy integration in the EU integration process as well in order to become more independent from the U.S. and NATO. There were plans to form multinational brigades and divisions of EU member countries as a start for a common EU military policy. This coincided with the new nationalist self confidence of German conservative leaders. Obviously there was no military threat to Germany any more, therefore German military forces as well as NATO as an institution had lost their immediate meaning. So the conservatives thought about a new role for German military forces and NATO, and they did so even before the unification and the Gulf war.

The Gulf war provided a good opportunity for the conservatives to relegitimize the military again. At that time there was still a consensus that the German military should not operate out of the NATO area. But the German government interpreted this consensus very extensively: German navy ships were sent to the Eastern part of the Mediterranean to replace US navy ships quickly moving to the Persian Gulf. 18 German combat aircraft were deployed to protect air bases in Eastern Turkey which were use by Allied bombers attacking Northern Iraq. Later it became public that AWACS aircraft which were used by NATO forces for reconnaissance and fire command tasks in the attacks against Iraq were partly manned by German aircraft officers. After the cease fire German military aircraft transported humanitarian supplies to the Kurds in Northern Iraq from April to June 1991. In spring 1991 the Germans like the Japanese sent minesweepers to clear mines in the Persian Gulf. From 1991 to 1996 the German government also put helicopters and air transport services to the disposal of the U.N. commission to monitor the disarmament obligations agreed to by the Iraqi government.

The Gulf war had a major impact on German public debate. Public opinion and even the peace movement was split. One part of the public and the peace movement said that the Gulf war was a war about oil resources and that the conservatives just tried to relegitimize the useless military. Other said that the U.N. should defend international law and not tolerate the invasion of one of its member countries. They also argued that German had the historical obligation to contribute to the
defense of Israel and the Jews. They demanded that Germany should at least send Patriot missiles for the defense of Israel against Iraqi missiles.

From November 1991 to November 1993 150 medical personnel of the German armed forces were sent to support UNTAC, the U.N. PKO in Cambodia. But like the Japanese troops they were not put under U.N. command. On October 14, 1993, one of the German medical staff was killed. The opposition parties in the German parliament were quite uneasy about the German blue helmets in Cambodia, suspecting that this would only be the beginning of more openly military missions of German troops abroad. On the other hand, the German Ministry of Defense used the German participation in UNTAC to start a ¥ 400 million PR campaign to praise the Germans troops as "Angels of Phnom Penh". But the Cambodia mission could still be regarded to be within the traditional concept of peacekeeping. Later there were more U.N. PKOs of the traditional type where German soldiers participated: From August 1992 to March 1993 German military aircraft supplied food to Somalia. Since February 1994 four officers and six medical staff are participating in UNOMIC in the Republic of Georgia to monitor a cease fire agreement between the government and separatist forces. And from July to December 1994 German aircraft transported humanitarian supplies to Rwandan refugees in Zaire. In several cases German civilian staff also participated in election monitoring.

But the more important issue was German military participation in the new type of U.N. PKOs in Somalia and former Yugoslavia which included military enforcement elements. This coincided with the re-organization of the German military to establish about 50,000 rapid deployment forces, officially called "crisis reaction forces".

From March 1993 to February 1994 as many as 1700 German soldiers were sent to UNOSOM II in Somalia, including more than 350 infantry-man. From the beginning it was clear that the German government did not intend to send troops for humanitarian reasons. On the contrary, it insisted that the German troops got a clearly visible military assignment. The U.N. then assigned the German troops the task to supply a major combat contingent of Indian troops which should enforce the disarmament of conflicting parties. However, the Indian troops never came. For German military planners the Somali mission was a very valuable exercise in logistics, but for peacekeeping it was quite useless, and the German soldiers were only busy receiving German politicians and journalists. During the mission there were minor attacks against German military vehicles, and when young Somali men tried to break into the German camp one of them was shot dead. The opposition parties took legal action against the German Somalia mission at the Supreme Court, but in June 1993 the Court only decided that the parliament should approve the mission. On July 2, 1993, the parliament gave its approval to the Somali mission, which had already started before.

The other case is former Yugoslavia. German military involvement started in July 1992 when German transport aircraft joined the air bridge to supply the city of Sarajewo beseiged by Serbian
troops. In 1993, additional air supplies were also transported to smaller Eastern Bosnian cities. At the same time, the German navy was sent to the coastal waters of former Yugoslavia to monitor the U.N. imposed arms embargo. It became public that NATO AWACS used to monitor the U.N. imposed no flight zone over Bosnia were also manned by German aircraft officers.

The opposition parties in the German parliament filed an action against the government at the Supreme Court because they thought that German government had decided about the military deployments to these missions lacking an appropriate legal base and without asking for the approval of the parliament. They could not convince the Supreme Court to issue a provisional order to withdraw German soldiers from out-of-area missions. The Supreme Court finally decided about the case on July 12, 1994. It said that Article 24 of the German constitution allowed full German military participation in collective military activities of U.N., CSCE as well as NATO, provided that the government gets the approval of the federal parliament. In a minority vote the dissenting judges of the Supreme Court strongly criticized the evasion of parliamentary rights by NATO, because NATO had already extended its activities beyond the limits of the NATO treaty without a revision of the NATO treaty which would have required full ratification by the German parliament.

After the decision of the Supreme Court the rules of engagement for the German navy ships monitoring the arms embargo were changed. The German navy ships now should not only monitor the movements of ships but they were now authorized to force suspected merchant ship to stop and be searched.

The German government further extended the military role of German troops to include combat mission under NATO command. As early as February 1994 NATO aircraft occasionally flew combat missions against Serbian air and land targets supported by AWACS reconnaissance and fire control. On December 20, 1994, the German government decided to offer NATO about 2,000 troops including Tornado combat aircraft with the alleged task to secure the evacuation of UNPROFOR soldiers from Bosnia. The task of the mission later was changed to enforce a cease fire in Bosnia under the terms of NATO. In May 1995 the U.N. and NATO did not prevent Croatia from conquering one Serbian held region which had been declared U.N. protected area. Angry Serbian troops took many U.N. soldiers as hostages. On June 30, 1995, the German federal parliament including some members of the opposition Social Democratic Party as well as the Green Party approved the government's plan to send the 2,000 German troops to former Yugoslavia to support the NATO mission. The German contingent included an army medical team to be deployed in Croatia, 14 Tornado fighter aircraft and a navy task force including naval aircraft, high-speed patrol boats and minesweepers. Deployment of German troops started in July 1995.

In July 1995 the two Eastern Bosnian towns of Srebrenica and Zepa, both declared U.N. protected zones, were overrun by Serbian troops which committed a genocide among the Muslim population. In August 1995, the major Serbian held part of Croatia, again officially a U.N. protected area, was
taken by Croatian troops. On August 30, 1995, NATO aircraft and artillery began a massive bombardment of Serbian positions in Bosnia which lasted several days. German military aircraft participated in these air strikes. At the moment German soldiers are still in Bosnia as part of NATO's IFOR mission which replaced UNPROFOR.

In less than one decade Germany took a far step from a military policy exclusively concerned with the defense of Germany and NATO to first participation in U.N. peacekeeping and finally to out-of-area military interventions. The German public took a much further step from the mass peace movements of the early 1980s to the Social Democrat and Green party members of parliament supporting German air strikes in 1995.

(5) comparative conclusions

In the final part of my presentation I want to draw comparative conclusions concerning the PKO debate.

First, the U.N. and traditional U.N. PKOs for a long time had enjoyed the support of public opinion in both Japan and Germany. The major difference between the two countries, however, was and still is that in Germany the idea of an European security system as well had become popular, including the opinion that Germany should contribute actively to the military dimension of such an European security system. The German public had been used to the concept of collective security before the new U.N. PKO debate started. Therefore it was easy for the military strategists to convincingly apply the concept of collective security to the U.N. during the Gulf War. In Japan the Jieitai did not have such a positively regarded regional security role. The Jieitai have always exclusively linked to burden sharing with the U.S. while the Japanese government always rejected the concept of collective security with the U.S. which would have included the defense of U.S. security interests by the Jieitai. U.N. based collective security including military intervention therefore is a very unfamiliar concept to the Japanese public.

Second, both in Japan and in Germany the Gulf war triggered a major public debate about the future role of the military. The major difference, however, was the fact that in Germany this debate had been linked to ethical values and moral responsibilities to defend human rights or, regarding the special German historical obligation, to assist Israel. This ethical and moral dimension was in fact very selective and inconsistent, but it helped to split the powerful peace movement in Germany. The defense of human rights was put against anti-militarism. In Japan however, I think, the Gulf war debate was much more dominated by the burden sharing argument, by the perceived need to secure good relations with the U.S. and other major powers. Therefore not the ethical/moral, but the cost/benefit argument was dominating the PKO debate in Japan. This obviously helped to strengthen the trading state logic and anti-militarism.
Third, domestic politics also seems to be relevant for a comparative analysis of Germany's and Japan's PKO debate. In Germany the Gulf War coincided with re-unification of East and West Germany. With the new unified nation a new German nationalism became popular. The ruling conservative-liberal coalition government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl even started to emphasize nationalism in order to attract popular support and in order to win the elections. For nationalists, the defense of national interests by national military forces is natural and self-evident. Because of the revival of nationalism in Germany, the opposition parties were not willing or able to prevent the slow but steady extension of the activities of Germany's military and could not force the ruling coalition to bind itself by explicit legislation for German military participation in U.N. PKO. In Japan however the LDP's loss of the majority in the House of Councillors in 1989 as well as in the House of Representatives in 1993 forced the conservative politicians and bureaucrats to find compromise solutions with the former opposition parties. Explicit legislation in the form of the PKO law had to be passed. The PKO law restricted the overseas activities of the Jieitai in order to maintain the basic principles of the Peace Constitution.

In theoretical terms (1) the regional context of foreign policy, (2) the normative base of foreign policy and (3) domestic politics affected the different outcome of the PKO debate in Germany as compared to Japan.

At the end of this presentation let me sum up my main arguments again:

(1) Unlike traditional PKO, the new type of PKO starting with the Gulf War should not be seen as part of a global peace order but as part of big power interventionism.

(2) The U.N. is not a world policeman concerned about global peace. The U.N. unfortunately has just served as an excuse or an easy way to justify power politics of the big powers.

(3) During the Cold War Japan and Germany in a similar way restricted the military. After the end of the Cold War Japan and Germany reacted in a different way to the "new interventionism". Japan's PKO participation is limited to traditional PKO. Germany's PKO participation was used to justify a slow but steady shift to the new interventionism.

As a peace researcher I think that the criticism of military interventions is still valid, even more valid, today. By comparing Germany's and Japan's PKO politics we should learn that demilitarization of international politics does not come naturally or automatically. We should also learn, that militarization or re-militarization of foreign policy, as it has happened in Germany, is always a danger. I think that the most essential thing for achieving a peaceful world is the active struggle of the people for peace and the resistance of public opinion against militarism.