Frame Semantics and Phrasal Semantics

Frame theory in the sense of Barsalou and others has very interesting things to say about various cognitive functions such as perception, categorisation, proprioception, and introspection. In fact, frames are supposed to implement, in Barsalou's words, 'a fully functional conceptual system'. Applying the theory to word meaning, as Loebner, Petersen & Osswald, and others have done, is highly attractive, since this results in a form of lexical semantics that is well embedded in a more general theory of cognitive functions. But while frames in general can convincingly represent content words and even certain simple sentences, it is, pace Barsalou, much less clear that they can also deal with the logical notions of negation, disjunction and (generalised) quantification. In this talk I will therefore propose a two-level system, in which a base component of meaning given by frames is extended with a conventional phrasal semantics in Montague's way. I will borrow certain insights from Frank Veltman's Data Semantics, by letting frames play a role that is usually played by possible worlds or situations in a Montague-like semantics, and by letting incompatibility of frames be a central notion, more central in fact than negation, which will be explained in its terms. Since frames offer a lot more structure than is usually provided for in phrasal semantics, more operations become available to the compositional system and we shall consider some of these.

Studierende und andere Interessierte sind herzlich willkommen.