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## "The Primacy of Subpersonal Content"

Abstract. In this talk, I argue that so-called subpersonal content is the primary form of mental content, by arguing that subpersonal content is the only kind of content that has a causal-explanatory role to play in cognitive science or, to the extent that personal-level content plays a causal-explanatory role in cognitive science, its doing so is strongly parasitic on the causal-explanatory role of subpersonal content. Among other points, I emphasize (i) a deep asymmetry in the modal profiles of the two kinds of content and (ii) the failure of the distinctive aspects of personal-level content (its robustly normative nature, for example) to do causal-explanatory work. Thus, if there is personal-level content, it derives from or depends upon a more fundamental kind of content, subpersonal content, not vice versa (as has often been claimed).