THE THEORY-LADENNESS OF EXPERIENCE

The aim of the conference is to bring together philosophers, psychologists and cognitive scientists whose work contributes to our understanding of the scope and limits of theory-ladenness phenomena, where these are broadly construed to include the domains of perception, scientific evidence and language. Related topics to be discussed: the modularity of mind, nonconceptual content, the epistemology of evidence and the semantics of observational terms.

PROGRAM

Thursday, March 10

09:30 – 10:30 Allan Franklin (Colorado) ‘The Theory Ladenness of Experiment’
10:40 – 11:40 Ioannis Votsis (Düsseldorf) ‘The Observation-Ladenness of Theory’
11:50 – 12:20 F.A. Müller (Rotterdam) ‘A Logical Analysis of Theory-Ladenness’
14:00 – 15:00 Michela Tacca (Düsseldorf) ‘Cognitive Penetrability and the Content of Perception’
15:10 – 15:40 Eva Schmidt (Saarlande) ‘Does Conceptual Content Have to be Objective? A Defence of Nonconceptualism’
17:00 – 18:00 William Brewer (Illinois, Urbana-Champaign) ‘Naturalized Approaches to Theory Ladenness: Evidence from Cognitive Psychology, History, and the Ecological Validity Argument’

Friday, March 11

09:30 – 10:30 Martin Kusch (Vienna) ‘Hallucinations and Microscopes: Comments on Bas van Fraassen’s Recent Work on Observability’
10:40 – 11:40 Gerhard Schurz (Düsseldorf) ‘Ostensive Learnability as a Criterion for Theory-Neutral Observation Concepts’
11:50 – 12:20 Vincent Israel-Jost (IHPST) ‘Epistemological Consequences of the Problem of Theory-Ladenness of Experience’
14:00 – 14:30 Guillaume Maranda (Bristol) ‘Begging the Question: A Reason to Worry about Theory-Dependence’
14:40 – 15:40 Markus Werning (Bochum) ‘How Alien are Concepts to Perception? Contrasting the Symbolic with the Emulative View of Concepts’
15:50 – 16:20 Ellen Fridland (Humboldt) ‘Perception, Skill and Cognitive Penetrability’
16:30 – 17:30 Robert McCauley (Emory) ‘Maturationally Natural Cognition and Radically Counter-Intuitive Science’