NOVEL PREDICTIONS
CONFERENCE

Date: February 25-26, 2011

Place: Heinrich-Heine Universitaet Duesseldorf, Faculty of Philosophy, Building: 23.21, Room: 00.46a

Organisers: Gerhard Schurz, Ludwig Fahrbach and Ioannis Votsis

Invited Speakers:
Martin Carrier (Bielefeld)
Deborah Mayo (Virginia Tech)
Cornelis Menke (Bielefeld)
Eric Barnes (SMU)
Roger White (MIT)
John Worrall (LSE)

Interested to attend? Please RSVP: votsis@phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de

For more information please visit our website: http://www.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/philo/personal/thphil/

The aim of the conference is to explore new and fruitful answers to three central questions: What are novel predictions? Ought novel predictions have more epistemic weight than mere accommodations? Can novel predictions help us make headway in the scientific realism debate? Related topics to be discussed: simplicity, unification, curve fitting, approximate truth, inference to the best explanation, no-miracles argument and scientific theory change.

Program

Friday, February 25
09:30 – 10:30 Martin Carrier (Bielefeld) ‘Prediction in Context: On the Comparative Epistemic Merit of Predictive Success’
10:40 – 11:40 Ludwig Fahrbach (Duesseldorf) ‘Scientific Realism without Novel Predictions’
11:50 – 12:20 Dean Peters (LSE) ‘How Should we Argue about Scientific Realism?’
14:00 – 15:00 Ioannis Votsis (Duesseldorf) ‘Novel Predictions: The Few Miracles Argument for Scientific Realism’
15:10 – 15:40 David Harker (East Tennessee State) ‘Scientific Realism and a Different Kind of Novel Success’
15:50 – 16:50 Cornelis Menke (Bielefeld) ‘On the Vagueness of “Novelty” and Chance as an Explanation of Predictive Success’
17:00 – 18:00 Eric Barnes (SMU) ‘The Roots of Predictivism’

Saturday, February 26
09:30 – 10:30 Gerhard Schurz (Duesseldorf) ‘Genuine Confirmation and the Use-Noveltiy Criterion’
10:40 – 11:40 Roger White (MIT) ‘Testing’
11:50 – 12:20 Jan-Willem Romeijn (Groningen) ‘Specificity, Accommodation, and the Sub-Family Problem’
14:00 – 15:00 Deborah Mayo (Virginia Tech) ‘Some Surprising Facts About (the problem of) Surprising Facts’
15:50 – 16:20 Kit Patrick (Bristol) ‘Modal Predictivism: A Novel Solution to the Paradox of Predictivism’
16:25 – 16:55 Samuel Schindler (Konstanz) ‘Against Novel Predictions, for Virtuous Theories’
17:00 – 18:00 John Worrall (LSE) ‘Prediction and Accommodation Revisited’