1. GOALS OF THE CONFERENCE

Values are constitutive for the self-conception of individuals and groups. The identification with fundamental values generates substantial aims and commitments for social communities and their members. By accepting binding values and striving to realize them individually and collectively, personal aspirations and social integration become focused and meaningful.

Some values are practically universally valid: life, health, love, wellbeing, security, social recognition. Other values are embedded in a certain political order or culture: freedom, autonomy, self-realization, democracy, authority, duty, self-control, material welfare, sexual equality. In addition, many values are subject to a more or less dynamic development and alteration. Today a change in values from “materialism” to “post-materialism” or from “collectivism” to “individualism” is frequently diagnosed (Inglehart 2005).

However, independent of the special content and characteristics of their particular values individuals and communities must find ways and means to transform their basic value-orientations into individual and collective actions so that the desired values are actually implemented. This includes a demand for efficient adaptation processes in the face of the change and alteration of values. In this context social norms play a central role: they are motivational drivers, aligning people's behaviour with the values it is socially supposed to serve. Seen from this view, social norms are instruments to realize certain values.

The central topic of the workshop focuses on this relation between norms and values: to increase our understanding of how norms
succeed or fail to realize desired individual and collective values from an interdisciplinary perspective; and to suggest how norms should and could change in the light of changing circumstances. These questions are not only of theoretical significance. In the face of new challenges to democratic societies such as globalization, terrorism, fundamentalism and cultural diversity, they are also of crucial practical importance.

To see social norms as instruments to realize values and to seek the conditions under which they can serve this purpose is not a new approach (Weber 1922; Parsons 1937). But it is a topic which deserves to be taken up again and to be studied with modern methods and insights. However, present-day research in this area is fragmented and isolated. On the one side there are several empirical studies which deal extensively with values and the change in values, on the other side theoretical models are developed to explain the emergence and maintenance of social norms. But seldom do we find the relation and the transfer-mechanisms between values and norms explicitly addressed and studied from an interdisciplinary perspective.

The workshop, therefore, aims to bring to bear in a unified way the resources of analytical philosophy, evolutionary economics, empirical political science, social psychology and sociology, to address a range of meta-level questions (concerning the logical and factual relations between norms and values; the internal aspect of norms; the evolution, maintenance and alteration of norms; norms and the emotions; the role of 'deficient' norms; and the social embeddedness of norms and values). In its applications, the workshop aims to offer practical suggestions for achieving a better fit between norms and values in the changing circumstances surrounding: democracy; security against terrorism; historical justice; sexuality; and belief formation.

2. THE BRIDGING-FUNCTION OF NORMS
2.1 The bridging problem: values and conduct

Norms are frequently offered as a solution to one central problem of value theory, which we call the 'bridging problem': how to bridge the gap between values, on the one hand, and conduct, on the other (Wallace et al. 2004).
The bridging problem can be viewed in a number of different lights. It can be viewed as a *conceptual* problem. One such version is related to the principle ‘Ought implies can’. Suppose values are making infeasible demands: then it would make no conceptual sense to say that we have reason or that it is valuable for us to conduct ourselves in ways that are unavailable to us (Kant 1997; Brown 1977). A second version relates to whether it is a conceptual pre-requisite for something to be a value that it bear some appropriate relation to conduct: for example, that it be the kind of thing that we can translate into our everyday conduct (Korsgaard 1996; Smith 1994). If so, the bridging problem must be solvable in principle for a value even to count as a value. The conceptual aspects of the bridging problem refer also to the fundamental philosophical question of how moral and non-moral values can be justified and in which way justifications of values can be directly or indirectly transformed into reasons for actions (Brandt 1996; Hare 1997; Wright 1963a; b).

The bridging problem can also be viewed as a *practical* problem concerning conduct. From this perspective it refers to the problem of which mechanisms values empirically are transformed into actual behaviour. Fallible human agents can fail to conduct themselves as they have most reason to conduct themselves due to cognitive and/or motivational failure. In the first case, agents fail to perceive what they have most reason to do (Owens 2002). In the second, they fail to be appropriately motivated by their values and reasons (Fischer et al. 1998; Stroud & Tappolet 2003). They might fail to be motivated by these values and reasons at all; or values/reasons might simply not supply enough motivating force, compared with the clamour of other motivating considerations, to induce the required conduct (Pettit 2003). This practical aspect of the bridging problem is reflected in the long concern of economics with invisible hands (Brennan & Hamlin 1995; 2000) and institutional development (North 1990), of political science with institutional design (Brennan 2001a; Goodin 1996; Ostrom 1990) and of sociology with socialisation and social integration.

### 2.2 Formal institutions as instruments of value realisation

Practical aspects of the bridging problem are often seen to be solvable by *formal collective institutions* of various kinds. The processes of collective decision-making might, for example, enhance our
appreciation of values through information pooling and deliberative refinement (Cohen 1989; Goodin 2000a). Formal mechanisms of command and control can also tell us what to do; and formal institutions of sanctions and incentives can help motivate us to comply with those collective prescriptions.

But though sometimes necessary, formal institutional sanctioning is often costly and ineffective (Brennan & Pettit 2004). Moreover, such institutions typically presuppose that some agents in the system act already in accordance with the desired values (Brennan, Kliemt & Gueth 2003; Goodin 2000b); and democratic systems further presuppose those agents being authorised by a significant majority of the general population motivated by the appropriate values and reasons (Habermas 1996). In short, the solutions assume that the bridging problem has already largely been solved. Institutions which are designed to enforce the values of a community could only exist when those values already exhibit sufficient efficacy by themselves as the basis for these institutions (Baurmann 2000). We should be wary of 'solutions' to problems that ultimately simply involve assuming the problem away.

Moreover, formal institutional sanctions might fail in the deeper task of properly incorporating reasons and values into our everyday conduct. H. L. A. Hart (1961) famously distinguished between 'being obliged' in ways that are externally imposed and 'being under an obligation' in ways that are internally felt. Internalising reasons and values in our everyday conduct requires the latter; institutional sanctions on their own provide only the former. They only produce external incentives to comply with values and therefore support only an ‘external point of view’ towards them. However, there are good reasons to assume that a social order is not viable in the long run if people do not adopt an ‘internal point of view’ in regard to the basic values of their community (Kliemt 1987).

2.3 Social norms as instruments for value realisation

The systematic failures of formal institutions to bridge the gap between values and behaviour strongly foster the view that social norms provide a crucial ingredient in an adequate solution to the bridging problem (Axelrod 1986; Brandom 1998; Elster 1989b; Gibbard 1990; Raz 1975; Baurmann 1999). Social norms are
behavioural prescriptions, designed to (or having evolved to) serve certain particular reasons and values (Bicchieri 1990; Elster 1989a; b; Sunstein 1996). They implement an informal social order that is not imposed externally, but is created and enforced endogenously by the members of a community themselves. Unlike purely formal institutional sanctions, norms necessarily have an internal as well as an external aspect. Not only do we externalise norms by holding others accountable to them (Horne 2001); we also internalise norms, taking a critical and reflective attitude towards our own conduct in light of them (Hart 1961; Elster 1989a). In this way social norms can transform an internal point of view towards individual and collective values to an internal point of view towards concrete behavioural demands.

For the bridging of values and behaviour the aggregation, co-ordination and co-operation functions of social norms are essential. Norms fulfil a general aggregation function insofar as they regulate individual and collective behaviour in such a way that an aggregated outcome is produced which should incorporate the desired values (Coleman 1990). Norms can furthermore perform a co-ordination function if a mutual adjustment of interpersonal behaviour is necessary to realize common aims and values. Norms enable co-ordination by helping us to know what to expect of one another, anticipating others’ behaviour and adapting our own conduct accordingly (Axelrod & Keohane 1986; Elster 1989a; Ellickson 1991; Gouldner 1960; Kuran 1998). Norms can also accomplish a co-operation function in situations in which actors risk producing a sub-optimal result because of dilemmatic and conflicting incentives. Social norms demand in these situations that the incentives for opportunistic behaviour be ignored and a strategy be chosen which leads to an efficient equilibrium and thereby to a state in which individual and collective values are achieved to a higher degree than in the case of unregulated behaviour (Axelrod 1986; Coleman 1987; Goodin 2002; Ullmann-Margalit 1977).

In the fulfilment of their various bridging-functions, norms themselves embody values such as fairness, reliability or trustworthiness. That means that behavioural regularities in interactive contexts can become infused with value in turn: therefore people become morally outraged when others act in ways that are inconsistent with the regular pattern, when others 'violate the norm'. This fact reminds us
that bridges carry traffic in both directions. Behavioural regularities may develop value rationalisations, as well as values giving rise to norms. In an evolving environment, the behavioural regularities can also persist after the original value rationale has evaporated. Norms can come apart from the values and reasons that originally justified them. Not only can norms cease to represent faithfully the underlying values of which they are putative expressions – but they may well stand in the way of developing new modes of conduct better fitted to those values.

3. SIGNIFICANCE AND INNOVATION

Although many theorists across philosophy and the social sciences have noted that norms seem to play this bridging function, the question of how and to what extent they are actually capable of doing so has received only very partial and incomplete answers. Such discussions have tended to occur in isolated and increasingly divergent ways across disparate disciplines. The conference is based on the long-term project to provide a unified account of the bridging function of norms, employing a perspective that is both philosophical and social scientific at one and the same time. Recent work in 'normativity' in various corners of philosophy and on the evolution of norms in economics and (in a very different way) in sociology make this a timely topic. Those various enterprises, however, pull in radically different directions. A coherent, unified understanding of norms is essential in order to 'make norms work', and especially to change them so they 'work better' in the service of the reasons and values they are supposed to be serving.

The initiators of the workshop share the conviction that norms are best considered simultaneously through a variety of disciplinary lenses and with the relation between practical examples and more abstract analysis always in view. Different disciplines – law, economics, political science, moral philosophy – all have a stake in the analysis of norms. But work on norms from diverse disciplines is rarely brought into joint focus.

The discussion at the conference will inform, and be shaped by, specific applications: to norms of democracy; of security; of historical justice; sexual behaviour; and issues of beliefs (doxastic norms). These arenas in which norms apply are interesting and important in their
own right; but they are especially interesting as a sample of the wide range of instances of the more general and more abstract phenomenon of normative solutions to the problem of 'bridging' between values and conduct.

The distinctive feature of this project lies in its multi-level and multi-disciplinary approach. Previous work has been radically fragmented both within and across philosophy and the social sciences. Within philosophy, work at the general level proceeds in splendid isolation from work at the specific or applied level, and often vice versa. Focusing exclusively on the general risks missing important nuances, with insufficient attention to the different kinds of norms and values in question and the different ways in which different norms function to promote and pursue them. Focusing exclusively on the specific and applied leads to a kind of tunnel vision, rich appreciation of the particular unconnected to the general.

A second kind of polarisation is along more overtly disciplinary lines: between those whose aim and method is squarely philosophical and those whose aim and method is derived from economics, political science, sociology or perhaps sociobiology. This is equally problematic. Philosophical inquiry uninformed by social scientific understanding of how norms function is prone to simplify and mislead. Empirical social scientific inquiry lacking adequate philosophical underpinning risks conceptual confusion.

The participants of the workshop are therefore selected according to the criteria that they have a strong record of operating across disciplinary boundaries and that each brings a somewhat different mix of skills and disciplinary orientations to the task.

4. TOPICS

The workshop work will be two-levelled and interactive. At the meta-level, we shall interrogate what norms and values are, and how, given our moral psychological makeup, norms work to promote and respect values. These meta-level enquiries will involve both philosophical analysis (of a metaphysical, epistemological and meta-ethical sort) and formal tools of economic, sociological and political analysis (decision theory, evolutionary game theory, graph theory and network analysis, etc.). At the applied-level, we shall examine certain particular kinds of norms that seem to pose particularly important challenges. The
elaboration of these applications can blend a wealth of material from applied ethics and the social sciences. The conclusions we reach about particular cases of functioning or malfunctioning norms will then be used to reflect back on the meta-level, and vice versa.

4.1 The theoretical analysis of bridging. On which of the following the workshop will focus in detail will depend upon the expertise of the participants recruited:

Values as reasons for norms. In which way do values justify norms and their social enforcement as instruments of value realization? To answer this question we have to differentiate between conceptual relations between valuations and prescriptions on the one side and empirical relations between valuations and the factual acceptance of norms on the other side. The study of these problems presupposes explications of the concepts of norms, values and actions and a philosophical and logical analysis of their interrelation (Dancy 2000; Hare 1997; Schurz 1997; Wright 1963a; b).

The internal aspect of norms. An important feature of norms is that they are internalised and externalised (Elster 1989a; Margolis 1990). But what, more precisely, does this involve? In part this is a conceptual philosophical question about norms and how they differ from mere regularities (Hart 1961; Smith 1994). In part it is a social scientific question about how processes of internalisation and externalisation occur (Cooter 2000). Drawing on evolutionary game theory, network analysis and decision theory, our aim is to understand the way these processes work as well as their underlying conceptual structure.

The evolution, maintenance and alteration of norms. How do norms come about? How are they maintained? And how do they alter (Axelrod 1986; Axelrod & Keohane 1986; Ostrom 2000; Sugden 1989; 1990)? We are particularly interested in how they evolve, are maintained and alter in respect of fulfilling the bridging function. In this context it seems fruitful to contrast models which explain evolution, maintenance and alteration of norms as a result of interactions between essentially self-interested agents (Elster 1989a; Mansbridge 1998; Posner 2000; Ullman-Margalit 1977) with models which operate with extended assumptions as, for example, dispositional and “virtuous” behaviour (Brennan 2001b; Güth/Kliemt 1994; Peacock & Schefczyk 2005; Vanberg 1994; Baumann 2002a) or
behaviour which is motivated by esteem or regard (Brennan & Pettit 2004; Baurmann 2002b).

**Norms, voluntary control and guidance.** In order for norms to constitute an adequate bridge between values and conduct, it seems conceptually required that we possess some kind of voluntary control over the domain in question. This point is frequently noted, but it is unclear what kind and degree of voluntary control is required and why it should be important. The standard answer – that it follows from 'ought implies can' (Alston 1989; Feldman 1988) – is inadequate, since there are many things we can do, over which we have no voluntary control. Most conceptions of guidance are either too strong (e.g. the 'intellectualist' conception associated with Kant and his followers: e.g. Korsgaard 1996) or too weak (e.g. the 'dispositionalist' conception). An alternative view associated with Brennan and Pettit (2004) is the 'virtual' conception. This will also link this up to questions about responsibility and praise and blame (Strawson 1962; Beckermann 2005).

**Norms, values and the emotions.** What is the role of emotions when we identify with certain values and when we obey or break corresponding norms? Wilful violations of norms evoke strong emotional responses (Elster 1996; Frijda 1986). The emotion-evoking nature of norms is an important way in which they are able to fulfil the bridging function. When the perpetrator is another agent, the emotions mobilised include disgust, anger, contempt, blame. When the perpetrator is the agent him- or herself, the relevant emotions include guilt, shame, self-disgust (Nussbaum 2004; Frank 1988; Taylor 1985). The impact of emotions can be deleterious as well as beneficial: anger can blind us, guilt can paralyse us, contempt can make us self-righteous. In investigating the role of the emotions, we can draw upon and bring together both recent work in empirical psychology (Haidt 2003), experimental research (Lawler et al. 2000) and work of a more conceptual and philosophical kind (Arpaly 2000; Jones 2003; Lahno 1995).

**Norms and practical/theoretical irrationality.** We are irrational when we suffer from some kind of internal incoherence. Two much-discussed kinds are akrasia and compulsion (Fischer et al. 1998; Stroud & Tappolet 2003). Norms might help reduce and overcome instances of irrationality (Frank 1988; Schelling 1985). Also in this
respect they can help to realize individual and collective values. We are also interested in the comparison between practical and theoretical rationality. Against the dominant view, we suspect that there may be cases of theoretical as well as practical akrasia (Owens 2002) whereby one fails to believe what one judges one has most (epistemic) reason to believe.

The role of 'deficient' norms. A 'deficient' norm is one that is inadequate to fulfil the bridging function. A norm may be deficient in either of two ways. First, the norm might not secure enough compliance – the motivating elements associated with the norm are weak, even though they are stronger than the motivating force of the underlying value. Alternatively, the norm might secure sufficient compliance, but the norm itself is imperfectly aligned to the underlying value. We are particularly interested in whether deficient norms might still serve some bridging-like function, even if they are not completely (perhaps not at all) behaviour-guiding (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). Norms with low-level compliance can still provide important orientation, they can embody scarcely unattainable “ideals”, there may be a trade-off between the conformity towards different norms and it could be that the expectation of norm adherence is more important than the adherence itself.

The social embeddedness of norms. To make norms work they must be socially embedded in two respects: on the one side they must be rooted in socially accepted values – from which they receive their justification as well as motives for their observance; on the other side they must be anchored in social relations and structures – by this the efficacy and adaptability of norms is facilitated. Social norms are crucially dependent on societal institutions (Ostrom 1990), social networks (Granovetter 1973; 1985), reciprocity and trust. This kind of “social capital” (Putnam 1993; 2000) in its diffusion and character is in turn strongly shaped by the values of a community (Baurmann & Zintl 2006).

4.2 Applications

Norms of democracy. By this we mean both: the norms that constitute and are presupposed by democratic rule; and the norms that emerge from democratic processes, having received reflective endorsement therein (Brennan & Hamlin 1999; Breannan & Lomasky
2000; Goodin 2003; Habermas 1996). We want to focus on how democratic norms fulfil the bridging function, and the kinds of reasons and values that democratic norms are capable of respecting and promoting (Goodin & List 2001; Goodin & Niemeyer 2003). How might particular democratic norms and practices need to alter over time, and with shifting circumstances (e.g. cultural diversity, technological change, international interdependence), in order to serve the deeper reasons and values that are their targets? Democratic norms are procedural. They often come into conflict with substantive values and reasons relating to 'best' outcomes or policies. How those conflicts might be optimally managed is both a practical problem and a conceptual one. But the conflicts also arise more generally in the 'paradox of democracy', involving the obligation to abide by collective decisions that one has voted against and believes wrong (Wollheim 1962; Baurmann 2003).

**Norms of security.** These are the (moral and legal) norms regulating what is permissible and impermissible in terms of defending ourselves from attack (Ignatieff, 2004). Our focus here is on the norms that pertain to domestic and international security, though we want also draw analogies with personal security and individual self-defence. Norms of security constitute a particularly important and challenging test-case for our approach for at least the following reasons (McMahan 2004). First, the traditional norms of security – e.g. just war (*jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*) – have increasingly come under pressure post-September 11 from critics who claim that they have outlived their usefulness. Second, terrorists (perhaps by definition) do not share the reasons and values that norms of security are meant to be promoting and respecting. Third, by the same token, there is a worry that the emerging norms of security regulating ways of fighting terrorism are undermining the reasons and values that the fight against terrorism is supposed to be serving (Boyle et al. 2003; Dershowitz 2003; Elstain 2003).

**Norms of historical justice.** These are norms pertaining to present attempts to respond to past wrongs. The question how to adequately treat those wrongs played an important role in many societies in the last years: Nazi-Germany, GDR, Russia, South-Africa, Australia. There are a number of familiar obstacles, due to the passage of time, that lie in the way of an adequate account of historical norms; some are judicial (Hart 1958), some informational, others motivational (Elster
2004; Ridge 2003; Waldron 1992). Our aim is to assess the reasons and values for rectifying past wrongs, and attempt to determine whether, and if so how, norms can be crafted to surmount these obstacles.

**Sexual norms.** By this we mean the norms regulating sexual conduct, including but not limited to pornography, prostitution, homosexuality/transsexuality, sexual assault, infidelity, incest and contraception. Philosophers in the liberal analytic tradition have tended to ignore sexual norms (Estlund & Nussbaum 1997), sometimes even going so far as to say that, so long as we are talking about consenting adults, such norms lie beyond the domain of the moral (Scanlon 1998). But this is surely not descriptive of the practice of contemporary states. Moreover, certain feminists (among others) have challenged the moral status of that view. Here as elsewhere, we will probe the reasons and values that norms of intimacy are supposed to serve, and consider how changing social circumstances might justify – and possibly force – revision in those norms for a better fit to those deeper reasons and values.

**Doxastic norms.** These are norms pertaining to what to believe (Feldman 1988; Miller 1995). Doxastic norms may be moral, rational or prudential, or epistemic. In the case of this application, questions of whether there are doxastic norms loom as large as those of what the content of particular norms ought be. Many epistemologists have thought there cannot be any doxastic norms because we do not or cannot have voluntary control over what we believe (Alston 1989). But this contradicts the social facts as Social Epistemology (Coady 1992; Goldman 1999) or an Economic Theory of Knowledge (Hardin 1997; 2002) make clear. We will explore what social function doxastic norms might serve, and what doxastic norms might best be instituted for translating reasons and values relating to belief into proper action within the constraints that govern freedom of action in this domain (Goodin & Brennan 2001).

5. **REFERENCES**


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