



## Abstracts

*Philip Pettit*

### **Between Norms and Values**

Norms can emerge without values but values play an important part in allowing norms to be moralized and thereby reinforced. Where, then, do values come from? This paper argues: from norms. It suggests that a basic norm of dialogue plays a crucial role in a naturalistic genealogy of the values that serve in turn to support various norms: [Paper](#)

*Robert Sugden*

### **Is There a Distinction Between Morality and Convention?**

In analysing the personality disorder of sociopathy, psychologists distinguish between moral principles (e.g. ‘You should not torture cats for amusement’) and norms (e.g. ‘You should not eat peas from your knife’). The idea seems to be that moral principles apply unconditionally, while norms are conventions, applying only in particular social settings. Inability to recognise this distinction is treated as diagnostic of sociopathy. But there is a tradition of social theory and moral philosophy that denies the validity of that distinction. In this approach, which can be traced back to David Hume, what we call ‘moral principles’ are ultimately no more than conventions about social practices of approval and disapproval, and are not essentially different from ‘mere’ norms such as table manners. According to this view, the idea that any particular set of moral principles is unconditionally true dissolves under philosophical analysis. I maintain that the Humean analysis is correct, but it seems clear that the psychologists’ diagnostic test is picking up some genuine empirical regularity. In this paper, I try to resolve the tension between these two lines of thought. I go on to ask how (if at all) someone who accepts the Humean analysis can participate in moral practices and moral discourses in good faith, instead of seeing them as the sociopath does: [Paper](#)

*Nic Southwood*

### **An Empire of Norms, Not of Laws**

Norms and laws share much in common. They are both social rules or requirements that inhere within particular groups or communities. Nonetheless, there are also crucial differences between them. In this paper I shall focus on three differences in particular concerning, respectively, their objects, sanctions and internalisation

conditions. I shall argue that appreciating these differences allows us to gain a better understanding of the different values they help to realise as well as to make some headway in explaining both their origin and evolution over time: [Paper](#)

*Bernd Lahno*

### **Norms of Evaluation vs. Norms of Conduct**

There are two forms of norms. Norms of conduct tell us directly what to do under certain circumstances. Norms of evaluation tell us what to value; combined with instrumental rationality they guide our actions indirectly by telling us what to aim at. In moral philosophy the distinction relates to opposing conceptions of Morality. Thus, Consequentialism may be understood as the conviction that all moral norms may be reduced to norms of evaluation whereas deontological ethics holds that morality is based on pure norms of conduct. I shall argue that consequentialism in this sense is wrong: No pure system of norms of evaluation combined with instrumental rationality can suffice as a proper guide in social interaction. I shall also reject deontological ethics: No pure system of norms of conduct can adequately reflect all our basic moral intuitions. A general tendency to reduce all norms to one or the other of the two forms may explain some conceptual difficulties in moral theory. Thus concepts as liberty or the dignity of man may be understood as the result of an attempt to reformulate norms of conduct within a consequentialist framework: [Paper](#)

*Edna Ullmann-Margalit*

### **“We the Big Brother”**

#### **Or: The Curious Incident of the Camera in the Kitchen**

Last summer, a member of the Rationality Center at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem took it upon himself to install a closed-circuit TV camera in the Center's kitchen. An email explained that the camera was installed in an effort to ensure cleanliness in the kitchen, by helping to catch those who left it messy. The camera was removed a week later: within this week, the members of the Center exchanged close to 120 emails among themselves, expressing their opinions for and against the camera and discussing related issues. Taking off from this exchange and repeatedly drawing on it, this article explores some of the surprisingly rich set of normative concerns touched upon by the kitchen-camera incident. They include a host of issues surrounding public surveillance and people's polarized attitudes to it, the problem of the invasive gaze and the argument that "if you have nothing to hide you have nothing to fear," the efficacy of disciplining behavior through sanctions and the problem of shaming sanctions, privacy and its arguable relevance to the kitchen case, and more. Special attention is given to the notion of cleanliness and to the norms engendered by it. In an epilogue, I offer some reflections in the wake of the incident. I find that it is precisely the smallness, concreteness and seeming

triviality of this incident that helps bring a large set of interconnected, vexing normative concerns into sharper relief: [Paper](#)

*Ernesto Garzón Valdés*

### **Radical Evil and Norms**

In the 20th century we have witnessed great calamities resulting from hatred and fanaticism. It has been maintained that these were expressions of "radical evil" taking us to the limits of human wickedness. Tragedy and perversion have reached such dimensions that they may seem impossible to comprehend, to prevent or to punish. I will sustain that these assertions are false: The catalogue of human perversion can always be extended. However, oblivion and impunity are morally unacceptable, and the only means to oppose atrocities are a persistent memory and the strict application of national and international penal law. I shall illustrate my position with some examples from the Argentine history of state terrorism.

*Cristina Bicchieri and Alex Chavez*

### **Behaving as Expected: Public Information and Fairness Norms**

What is considered to be fair depends on context. Using a modified version of the Ultimatum Game, we demonstrate that both fair behavior and perceptions of fairness depend upon beliefs about what one *ought* to do in a situation – that is, upon *normative expectations*. We manipulate such expectations by creating informational asymmetries about the offer choices available to the Proposer, and find that behavior varies accordingly. Proposers and Responders show a remarkable degree of agreement in their beliefs about which choices are considered fair. We discuss how these results fit into a theory of social norms: [Paper](#)

*Lina Eriksson*

### **Rational Choice Explanation of Norms: What They Can and Cannot Tell Us**

It is quite common to use rational choice both to define social norms and to explain their existence and/or origin. In the first case, social norms are defined as solutions to coordination and/or other games, in the second they are explained by their functions in such games. This paper looks at the kind of questions about social norms that rational choice accounts can answer. By being more clear about what rational choice accounts do tell us, the paper also point out important questions about social norms that such accounts do not answer, thereby identifying the gaps in such accounts, and possible extensions of the theory that might cover some of those gaps. Such questions concern the nature of normativity of norms, the common knowledge aspect of norms, the problem of explaining why a particular norm exists rather than just explaining why *some* norm exists (a question related

but not reducible to the problem of equilibrium selection), and general problems with the functionalist approach to social norms: [Paper](#)

*Ruth Zimmerling*

### **Dispositions:**

#### ***Trompe l'oeil* or Real Pillars in the Statics of Rational Norm-Compliance?**

In order to overcome certain well-known inadequacies of the classical “brute” Homo Oeconomicus model, particularly concerning the possibility of rational norm-compliance, several authors have suggested the introduction into the model of the capacity for the rational choice of dispositions. The approach looks intuitively attractive, but it has, to my knowledge, not been subjected to the test of a careful analysis of what exactly its adoption entails and whether it is logically sound and psychologically feasible. It is thus an open question whether dispositions are of the right stuff to support the idea of rational norm-compliance – and if so, what kinds of dispositions and whether they can be produced by choice –, or whether their superficial attractiveness crumbles under the weight of the task assigned to them. The purpose of this paper is to contribute towards an answer to that question by (i) taking a close look at the notion of a disposition, probing into the consequences a consistent conception must have for the possibility of (a) rationally choosing a disposition as well as (b) rational choice under a disposition; and (ii) using the results of these reflections to assess several specific proposals: [Paper](#)

*Rainer Hegselmann, Oliver Will and Eckhart Arnold*

#### **From Small Groups to Large Groups: Some First Steps Towards a Simulation Model of Hume's Moral and Political Theory**

In *Of Morals* and *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* David Hume gives a draft of the origin of virtue and government. According to Hume, both are human inventions. They evolved and emerged in a long process that finally made it possible for us – i.e. mammal beings with a ‘natural’ nature that is more appropriate for living in small groups – to live together in large societies. Hume delivered a qualitative draft – more detailed and thought through than anything else at his time, nevertheless, a draft. With HUME1.0 we start to develop a computational model of that draft. The computational model will have precisely defined assumptions. Parameters, that are involved, will be explicit. That will allow to seriously study the interplay of a bunch of mechanisms. We should be able to analyse systematically under what assumptions – in which parameter regions, more factual or more contra-factual ones – virtues, specialization, and wealth prosper. We should be able to find out how robust or how sensitive these processes are when parameters and/or mechanisms vary more or less: [Paper](#)

*Gerhard Schurz*

### **Global Value Distribution and Value Clashes**

Huntington's view of world-cultures as historically enduring characteristics is criticized from an evolution-theoretic and empirical viewpoint. Huntington's world-cultures seem to be momentary developmental stages of certain cultural evolutionary processes which in relation to each other are temporally displaced. Do these cultural processes go all into the same direction of (post-) modernization, as Inglehart has argued? The results of the empirical studies of the World Value Survey (WVS) project support a different diagnosis. Altogether it seems that cultural evolution does not follow a uniform trend, but stands under opposite evolutionary forces, whose strength are dependent on the level of economy and education. The location of cultural equilibria in the cultural world-map and the regions in which societies stay stable for long time are largely dependent on the constellation of these forces: [Paper](#)

*Hartmut Kliemt*

### **The Impossibility of Social Choice and the Possibilities of Individual Values**

For the methodological individualist the very notion of “collective choice (making)” seems problematic while the concept of forming an order of social states does not raise comparable problems. The value rankings that individuals have on their minds may have a causal effect on which states of affairs emerge but it is unclear how. Several possibilities of construing the relationship between emergent outcomes and values are discussed. Ignoring philosophical subtleties the focus is on such simple things as opportunity costs: [Paper](#)

*Russell Hardin*

### **The Story of Qiu Jou**

Zhang Yimou's film, *The Story of Qiu Ju*, can be seen as a tale of the changing, often conflicting systems of norms that govern and drive interactions in the life of a small rural village. The norms and, indeed, the whole system of these norms are in transition to fit the transitions in the larger Chinese society, especially in its demography and economy. The norms change because the structure of the society changes, and therefore the problems and the structures of interactions that must be regulated change. The transitions that are sweeping such communities as that of Qiu Ju carry the villagers from norms that are *local, informal, and personal*, to norms that are *abstract, formal, and impersonal*, with variation in degrees on all these dimensions, and then on to institutionalized legal rules that trump many of the local norms: [Paper](#)