

## PAUL D. THORN

Philosophisches Institut  
University of Düsseldorf  
Universitätsstr. 1, Düsseldorf  
40225 Germany

thorn@phil.uni-duesseldorf.de  
Tel.: +49 (0)211-81-15461  
Fax: +49 (0)211-81-15764

**Citizenship** Canadian.

**Academic Positions** Postdoctoral Researcher, for the project “Probability Logic and Non-Monotonic Reasoning from an Evolutionary Perspective.”  
University of Düsseldorf, 2009-.  
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, New College of Florida, 2008-09.  
Pre-doctoral Researcher, in the Research Group “Philosophy, Probability, and Modeling.” University of Konstanz, 2002-03.

**Education** Ph.D. in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, 2007.  
Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona.  
M.A. in Philosophy, 1998.  
Department of Philosophy, Simon Fraser University.  
B.A. in Philosophy (with First Class Honors), 1996.  
Department of Philosophy, Simon Fraser University.

**AOS** Epistemology, Philosophy of Probability, Logic.

**AOC** Early Modern Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Decision Theory, Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Science.

**Dissertation** *Three Problems of Direct Inference*

Committee: John Pollock (chair), Terry Horgan, Shaughan Lavine

Abstract: It is common to use frequency information to form judgments of likelihood, e.g., it’s usually sunny in Tucson, so it will probably be sunny there tomorrow. The inferences that we make when we form probabilistic beliefs about singular propositions on the basis of frequency information are called “direct inferences.” Although we have a rough sense of how direct inference works, it turns out to be extremely difficult to be precise about the rules governing these inferences. Indeed, problems quickly surface when we reflect carefully on everyday examples. In my dissertation, I propose rules that deal with three central problems that arise when we use frequency information to form judgments of likelihood.

- Publications** “Two Problems of Direct Inference.” Forthcoming in *Erkenntnis*.
- “Undercutting defeat via reference properties of differing arity.” Forthcoming in *Analysis*.
- “An Objective Argument for Thirdism.” (with *The Oscar Seminar*) *Analysis*, Vol. 68, Issue 298, 2008.
- “The Trouble with Pollock’s Principle of Agreement” *The Reasoner* Vol. 1(8), 2007.
- “Paraconsistency and the Image of Science.” In *Logical Consequence: Rival Approaches*. ed. Bryson Brown, and John Woods. Paris: Hermes Science, 2001.
- Conference Presentations** “Defeasible Conditionalization.” European Epistemology Network Meeting, Lund University, 2011.
- “Cognitivist Probabilism.” 7<sup>th</sup> Annual Formal Epistemology Workshop, University of Konstanz, 2010.
- “Two Problems of Direct Inference.” 3<sup>rd</sup> Formal Epistemology Workshop Festival, University of Toronto, 2010.
- “Cognitivist Probabilism.” Meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy, Kansas State University, 2010.
- “Defeasible Conditionalization.” ProbNet10, University of Salzburg, 2010.
- “Probability Judgment and Uninformative Statistics.” Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, University of British Columbia, 2008.
- Comments on “Perplexities in Williamson’s Anti-Luminosity Argument.” Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, University of British Columbia, 2008.
- “Rationality and Inconsistency.” Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, York University, 2006.
- “Rationality and Inconsistency.” Meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy, University of California San Diego, 2006.
- “Projectability and the Problem of the Reference Class.” *Plenary Session*, Meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy, University of Maryland, 2004.
- “A Theory of Competing Reasons.” Meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy, Simon Fraser University, 2003.
- “Reasoning from Conflicting Information.” Invited Paper, International Summer School on Philosophy and Probability, University of Konstanz, 2002.

“Epistemic Applications for Paraconsistent Consequence Relations.”  
Meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy, University of Lethbridge,  
1999.

“Preserving Dilution of Incoherence.” Informal Logic Conference,  
University of Victoria, 1997.

### **Awards**

Advocate of the Year, University of Arizona Graduate Student  
Association, 2005-06 and 2006-07.

Outstanding Graduate Student Leader, University of Arizona, 2006.

Representative of the Year, University of Arizona Graduate Student  
Association, 2004-05.

Graduate College Travel Grant, University of Arizona, 2004.

Graduate Fellowship, Center for Junior Research Fellows,  
University of Konstanz, 2002.

Graduate Fellowship, Simon Fraser University, 1997.

### **Teaching**

As the Primary Instructor, at New College of Florida:

- Games and Decisions
- Philosophy of Mind
- Modern Philosophy
- Metaphysics

As the Primary Instructor, at the University of Arizona:

- Minds, Brains, and Computers
- Philosophy of Science, x2
- Introduction to Philosophy
- Logic and Critical Thinking, x4
- Science and Inquiry

As a Teaching Assistant, at the University of Arizona:

- Early Modern Philosophy, x2
- Introduction to Philosophy
- Logic and Critical Thinking
- Justice and Virtue
- Mind, Matter, and God
- Science and Inquiry
- Personal Morality
- Philosophical Perspectives on the Individual

As a Teaching Assistant, at Simon Fraser University:

- Knowledge and Reality
- Introduction to Logic and Reasoning, x2
- Critical Thinking

**Service** Referee, *Erkenntnis*, *Philosophical Frontiers*.  
University of Arizona Graduate Student Association President, 2006-07.  
University of Arizona Graduate Student Association Vice President,  
2005-06.  
University of Arizona Graduate Student Association Treasurer, 2004-05.  
Principal Organizer for Third Arizona Summer Workshop in Philosophy,  
University of Arizona, 2004.  
Graduate Student Representative to the Philosophy Department Faculty,  
Simon Fraser University, 1997-98.

**Graduate Coursework** In Epistemology and Philosophy of Science:  
Seminar on Epistemology, Keith Lehrer  
Seminar on Epistemic Cognition, John Pollock  
Seminar on Philosophy of Science, Jenann Ismael  
Seminar on A Priori Knowledge, Phil Hanson  
Seminar on Philosophical Naturalism, Phil Hanson

In Probability and Decision Theory:  
Seminar on Practical Cognition, John Pollock  
Probability Theory, Maciej Wojtkowski  
Statistical Theory, William Faris  
Game Theory, Amnon Rapoport

In Logic:  
Seminar on Paraconsistent Logic, Ray Jennings  
First Order Logic, Shaughan Lavine  
Number Theory and Fixed Point Results, Shaughan Lavine  
Model Theory, Shaughan Lavine

In Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science:  
Seminar on Folk Psychology, Alvin Goldman  
Philosophy and Psychology, Alvin Goldman  
Psychology of Human Reasoning, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini  
History of Generative Grammar, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini  
Seminar on the Philosophy of Daniel Dennett, Kathleen Akins  
Seminar on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Bjørn Ramberg  
Philosophy of Mind, Joseph Tolliver  
Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence, John Pollock

In Early Modern Philosophy:  
Seminar on Descartes and Locke, David Owen  
Seminar on the Philosophy of David Hume, David Owen

In Ethics:  
Seminar on Metaethics, Michael Smith  
Normative Ethics, Michael Smith

**References**

Gerhard Schurz  
Chair, Theoretical Philosophy  
Institut für Philosophie  
University of Düsseldorf  
Universitätsstr. 1, Düsseldorf  
40225 Germany  
gerhard.schurz@phil.uni-  
duesseldorf.de

Terry Horgan  
Professor  
Department of Philosophy  
University of Arizona  
P.O. Box 210027  
Tucson, AZ 85721-0027  
horgan@email.arizona.edu

Shaughan Lavine  
Associate Professor  
Department of Philosophy  
University of Arizona  
P.O. Box 210027  
Tucson, AZ 85721-0027  
shaughan@arizona.edu

David W. Owen  
Associate Professor  
Department of Philosophy  
University of Arizona  
P.O. Box 210027  
Tucson, AZ 85721-0027  
dwo@u.arizona.edu

Luc Bovens  
Professor  
Department of Philosophy, Logic  
and Scientific Method  
London School of Economics  
Houghton Street  
London, WC2A 2AE  
l.bovens@lse.ac.uk