Bastian Fischer - Phenomenal Consciousness: Sensorimotor Contingencies and the Constitution of Objects

This paper expands the work of O’Regan and Noë [3], who offer a dynamicist account of visual consciousness. They overcome the difficulties of functionalism and representationalism raised by neuropsychological studies about the arbitrariness of the inversion of the retinal image [4], the necessity of a dynamic plurality of action-dependent signals for cognition [1], and the necessity of going beyond the human nervous system when explaining cognitive and conscious achievements of sentient subjects [5] – difficulties also emphasized through theoretical arguments [2].   O’Regan & Noë offer a novel materialist account of sensorimotor contingencies. Their theory is enriched by the concept of practical knowledge about the changes of sensual stimuli that dynamic, nomological changes of the perceptual apparatus relative to the perceived object bring about. Behaviorism does not involve such knowledge about one’s own consciousness. Functionalism does, but usually assumes single and static representations of those system states fulfilling certain causal roles in a conscious system and giving rise to or being equated with conscious states. When utilizing sensorimotor contingencies, however, there must occur at least two different states of the conscious system in order to account for conscious experience. I will move towards a formalization of O’Regan’s & Noë’s theory [3].   This will help implementing their model into artificial agents. On O’Regan’s & Noë’s account, however, the existence of objects that are perceived in the environment of the subject is presupposed from an externalist point of view.   In its current state the theory cannot, if implemented, enable a cognitive agent to constitute material objects automatically. A proposal for an extention of O’Regan’s & Noë’s theory that takes care of this further desired step in understanding and modelling consciousness will be given. It will involve a finite series of potential object variables that are defined and turned into constants whenever a certain input of similar, repeated sense data occurs. Rather than externally ascribing to the constant as a meaning the real world object where the signals are emitted from, its semantic content will be confined to the sensorimotor contingencies the sentient subject just discovered. Moderate realism is not in danger: if the machine is provided with the right types of sense and with appropriate goals, the objects it will constitute could be quite similar to the ones we usually assume to exist.

References

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O’Regan, J.K. und Noë, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visuacons ciousness, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25 (4), 883–975.

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Thompson, E. and Varela, F.J. (2001). Radical embodiment: Neural dynamics and conscious  experience, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5, 418–25.